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Abstract. The study empirically examined the impact of governance on domestic investment in 16 African countries 
with a balanced panel data set, between the years 2002 and 2015. The study employed six unbundled governance 
indicators from the World Bank, World Governance Indicators and constructed three bundled governance indicators 
using the Principal Component Analysis. The Driscoll and Kraay Fixed Effects model which accounts for serial 
correlation, groupwise heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional dependence were employed with empirical results 
revealing that all the indicators of governance positively and significantly influence domestic investment in Africa, except 
for government effectiveness which happens to be insignificant. Also, Voice/Accountability and the Control of Corruption 
exert more influence on domestic investment as indicated by their coefficient values. Furthermore, economic growth is 
also an important factor in explaining domestic investment in Africa. Policy recommendations are discussed. 
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Investment has mostly been described as a significant component of growth in economic 
discourse. It has been deemed essential for economies in order to enhance economic growth, 
increase employment and reduce poverty. Investment has been considered to be essential to 
the African region as it enables job creation and feed its teeming population. 
According to Ouedraogo and Kouaman (2014), an investment can improve production 
capacity through the acquisition of new equipment which incorporates technical progress and 
thus increases labour productivity. Investment can also increase productivity through the 
increase in aggregate demand as well as increasing employment and wages. Economic theory 
posits that a significant factor influencing investment is the real cost of borrowing, which adjusts 
for the rate of inflation, likewise economic growth. Investment is essential for economies whose 
priority is a consistent movement towards economic growth and development. Hamuda et al. 
(2013) point out that countries that have accumulated a high level of long-term investment 




belong to the cadre of developed nations. Investment in machinery and buildings not only create 
jobs but also contributes to the current demand for capital goods and thus increases domestic 
expenditure. An increase in investment also prompts an increase in aggregate supply, which 
helps in relaxing stagflationary tendencies. 
According to Lim (2014), between 1980 and 2010, gross capital formation rate ranged from 1 
to 90 per cent of production in the world. This loose gap in investment activity has been 
connected to diverse varieties of frictions existing in many economies and has hindered the 
normalisation of the proceeds from investment undertakings across countries (Chuku, Onye and 
Ajah, 2015). 
In comparison to other regions of the globe, the level of domestic investment in Africa stands 
low, as reported in Figure 1.1. The figure shows that sub-Saharan Africa, which of course is a 
subset of Africa, has the lowest level of domestic investment in the world between the years 
2000 and 2016 as indicated by the region’s gross fixed capital formation. Europe and Central 
Asia (ECA) had the highest level of domestic investment in the world. This is not farfetched as 
the region is made up of the most advanced countries in the world. Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC) comes just behind the ECA. In fact, the level of domestic investment in LAC is 
more than six times the level of domestic investment in sub-Saharan Africa and about twice the 
level of domestic investment in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in 2000. The 
substantial disparity between domestic investment undertaken in sub-Saharan Africa and that of 
LAC and ECA is also apparent across the time structure of the data observation. In sub-
Saharan Africa, though the lowest among other regions, the level of domestic investment in the 
region has continuously increased. 
 
Figure 1.1. Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Constant US$ (2000-2016) 
Source: Authors computation from World Development Indicator, WDI (2017) 
Note: SSA is Sub Saharan Africa, MENA is the Middle East and North Africa, ECA is Europe and Central Asia, SA is 
South Asia, and LAC is Latin America and the Caribbean 
In 2005, domestic investment in sub-Saharan Africa increased to more than US$ 154 billion 
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Saharan Africa increased to more than US$ 269 billion in 2010 and further increased to more 
than US$ 332 billion in 2015, according to the data. 
The quality of governance is pointed out as one of the factors that significantly affect the 
variations in investment activities across countries and regions. According to Khan (2007), 
governance has been identified as a critical factor explaining the difference in economic 
performance across developing countries. According to Akanbi (2010), the low quality of 
governance, which is mirrored by the insecure political atmosphere in most African nations has 
remained a key hindrance to the growth of domestic investment over time. This then has made 
it imperative to model investment determinants by incorporating the quality of governance 
(Ajide, 2013). Fayissa and Nsiah (2013) argue that good governance or the absence of sound 
governance adds to the gap in income per capita amongst richer and poorer African nations. 
Chauvet and Collier (2004) posit that countries experiencing poor governance are associated 
with an average of 2.3 percentage points less GDP per year relative to other developing 
countries. In fact, there is a current stream of African development literature which suggests that 
governance is essential in driving private investment (Asongu et al., 2015), growth (Asongu, 
2016a), inclusive development (Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016) and the fight against policy 
syndromes such as capital flight (Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2017) and terrorism (Asongu et al., 
2017). 
In the empirical literature, various studies have examined the determinants of investment 
across countries. Studies by Aysan, Gaobo and Marie-Ange (2005), Bader and Malawi (2010), 
Eregha (2010), Majed and Ahmad (2010) show that interest rate negatively affects investment. 
These conclusions support the Keynesian theory of investment where investment choices are 
made by relating the Marginal Efficiency of Capital (MEC) to the real interest rate. The 
investment would be made if the MEC is higher than the real interest rate and as such, the real 
interest rate is negatively associated with investment decisions. Studies by Batina (1998), 
Pereira (2000) and Pereira (2001) have also revealed that growth spurs investment, which 
supports the accelerator theory of investment. This theory asserts that increasing output drives 
investment. According to Gordon (2009), temporary changes in output could lead to changes in 
investment spending. The modified version of this theory introduced a time lag between the 
increase in output and the subsequent increase in investment. 
Tobin (1969) developed an investment theory known as the Tobin Q theory. Tobin Q can be 
defined simply as the proportion of the market value of a unit of capital to its replacement cost. 
Q, according to Romer (2012) is said to summarise complete information about the future that is 
important to a firm’s investment choice. Q reveals in what way an extra dollar increase in capital 
affects the present value of profits and so when Q is high, firms want to increase their capital 
stock, and when Q is low, firms reduce it. 
Inquiries on the impact of governance on domestic investment are rare as most related 
studies focus more on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), notably: Morisset (2000), Globerman 
and Shapiro (2002), Asiedu (2005), Samini and Ariani (2010) and Mengistu and Adhikary 
(2011). Firms invest when the investment climate is favourable, and governance quality is a 




subset of the investment climate in Africa. Among the few studies on the role that governance 
plays in the domestic investment decision is that of Ouedrago and Kouaman (2014), which 
examines the role of governance in explaining private investment in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
study employed 38 sub-Saharan African countries from 2006 to 2011 and made  use of the 
Generalised Method of Moment (GMM) estimation technique. The results revealed that heavy 
regulations disturb private investment, whereas the business environment improves investment 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Aysan, Nabli and Veganzones (2011) also studied the impact of 
governance on private investment in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Their 
empirical findings revealed that corruption control, bureaucratic quality, investment-friendly 
administrations, law and order and a stable political environment play significant roles in 
explaining private investment decisions. Ngov (2008), using intra-group regression investigated 
the impact of governance on FDI as well as promoting domestic investment along with growth 
performance in three different income sets of countries which include low-income countries, 
middle-income countries and high-income countries. The result revealed that governance is 
positively related to per capita growth rate in both the middle and high-income groups but not in 
the low-income group. The result further revealed that governance has a positive impact on total 
investment ratio, which is a combination of domestic investment and FDI. 
In empirical examining the impact of governance on domestic investment in Africa, this study 
employs a balanced panel data of 16 African countries as reported by World Development 
Indicators (WDI, 2017) and the World Governance Indicators (WGI, 2017) of the World Bank for 
the year 2002 to 2015. Data availability constraints strictly guided the choice of countries. The 
remainder of this research is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the methodology and 
model specification adopted in the study. Section 3 presents the econometric results. Section 4 
concludes the research with relevant policy recommendations. 
 
2. Methodology and Model Specification 
 
The study employed descriptive statistics, the correlation matrix and panel linear models 
comprising of the pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS), the Fixed Effects (FE) model and the 
Random Effects (RE) model. The descriptive statistics employed the mean of each of the 
variables within the countries employed in the study. This would enable us to understand the 
distinct uniqueness of the economic and governance fundamentals employed in the model. The 
correlation matrix helps to understand the degrees of substitution of relationships among the 
variables in the model, which are particularly important in order to avoid the problems of 
multicollinearity and biased estimates. 
Also, the study employed nine bundled and unbundled governance indicators sourced from 
WGI. The bundled governance indicators were constructed by exploiting Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) to reduce six governance variables. Results permitted to obtain the following 
constructs: (1) political governance, which comprises political stability and voice/accountability, 
(2) economic governance, which is composed of government effectiveness and regulatory 




quality, and (3) institutional governance, which includes the control of corruption and the rule of 
law. According to Asongu et al. (2017), the principal component analysis involves reducing a set 
of strongly correlated indices into an uncorrelated set of small variables known as Principal 
Components (PC). According to Tchamyou (2017), the PCs are said to account for most of the 
information in the original data set. In the PCA, it is required that only common factors that have 
an eigenvalue greater than one or the mean should be retained (Kaiser, 1974; Jollife, 2002). 
Among the three alternative estimation techniques, the pooled OLS which is an OLS 
technique that is run in panel data assumes that there is no heterogeneity across cross sections 
and stated as; 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖       [1] 
where 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 is the natural logarithm of gross fixed capital formation which proxy’s for 
domestic investment, 𝛼𝛼 is the common intercept, 𝑋𝑋 is a vector of control variables which 
comprises of the natural logarithm of Gross Domestic Product in constant US$, which proxy’s 
for real economic growth, the natural logarithm of exchange rate for each of the individual 
countries’ currency employed in the model to the US$, and the real interest rate which signifies 
the real cost of borrowing. 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 is composed of the governance indicators (both bundled and 
unbundled). They include political stability, voice/accountability, political governance, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, economic governance, control of corruption, rule 
of law and institutional governance. 𝜖𝜖 is the error term while i denotes the cross-sectional index, 
𝑡𝑡 denotes the time index. 
The FE model which controls for heterogeneity across countries in the intercept parameters is 
expressed as; 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖       [2] 
where 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is the regional specific parameter which denotes the fixed effect. According to 
Algieri and Mannarino (2013), the 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is said to represent ignorance about every other systematic 
feature that predict the dependent variables other than 𝑋𝑋 and 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺. The basic insight into the FE 
model is that 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 does not change over time. Hence any variations in the outcome variable must 
be due to stimuluses other than these fixed individualities (Stock & Watson, 2008). The FE 
model is commonly used when examining the influence of variables that change with time as it 
controls for fixed individual characteristics of the countries in the model. 
The RE model, on the other hand, treats the heterogeneity across cross sections as random 
components and is stated as; 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖       [3] 
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the distinct specific error, also known as the between-entity error. The variations across 
units are presumed to be random and uncorrelated with the independent variables in the model. 
In the RE model, it is assumed that the entity error term is uncorrelated with the independent 
variables in the model and thus allowing time-invariant variables play a role as explanatory 
variables. 




The choice of the study’s baseline model is based on several tests. In choosing between the 
FE and the pooled OLS, the study applies the F-test which confirms if there is omitted variable 
bias in the model. A p-value of less than 5 per cent signifies that there are important country 
effects, which means that overlooking unobserved heterogeneity in the model can lead to 
estimation bias and inconsistency. The study also tests between the pooled OLS and the RE 
model using the Breusch-Pagan (BP)-Langragian Multiplier (LM) test. The null hypothesis of the 
BP-LM test is that there is no substantial variance across regions. A less than 5 per cent 
probability value for the BP-LM test indicates that the RE model is appropriate, and the pooled 
OLS is not appropriate. The Hausman 𝜒𝜒2 test is also performed in selecting between the FE 
model and the RE model. According to Algieri and Mannarino (2013), the Hausman 𝜒𝜒2 test is 
intended to identify a violation of the RE modelling assumption that the regressors are 
orthogonal to unit effects. This means that there is no correlation between the independent 
variables and the unit effect. This further implies that the estimates of the FE model should be 
analogous to the estimates of the RE model. While the alternative hypothesis is that the FE 
model is preferable to the RE model, the null hypothesis is that both the FE and the RE produce 
similar coefficients. According to Baek and Yang (2010), the Hausman test allows us to 
determine whether the appropriate error terms are fixed or drawn from a random distribution. A 
p-value greater than 5 per cent denotes that both the FE model and the RE model are reliable 
but the RE model is more efficient because it utilises a lesser degree of freedom. The study also 
tests for serial correlation, which biases the standard errors in linear panel data models and 
makes findings less efficient according to Drukker (2003). The study applies the Wooldridge 
(2002) test, which hypothesises a null indicating the absence of autocorrelation in the model. 
We also test for heteroskedasticity in the FE model using the modified Wald test developed by 
Lasker and King (1997). The null hypothesis of this test is that the variance of the error is similar 
for all countries (Amaz, Gaume and Lefevre, 2012). The study also tests for crosssectional 
dependence in the model employing the Pesaran (2004) CD test and the Pesaran (2004) scaled 
LM test. According to Baltagi, Kao and Peng (2016), cross-sectional dependence could arise as 
a result of unknown common shocks, spatial effects or interactions within social networks. 
Overlooking cross-sectional dependence could result to estimation bias. A reason for cross-
sectional dependence, according to De Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006), may be due to the growing 
economic and financial integration of countries and financial bodies, which suggests solid 
interdependencies amongst cross sectional entities. 
Countries involved in this study include Algeria, Egypt, Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, 









3. Presentation and discussion of empirical results 
 
This section begins with a simple descriptive statistic of the variables in the model employing 
the mean for each cross section. Results from Table 3.1 reveal that in its natural logarithm, 
domestic investments are quite similar across the countries employed in the model. While 
Liberia has the lowest mean value of 19.18, South Africa has the highest level of domestic 
investment with a mean value of 24.93 for the years n view. Also, in the third column, economic 
growth likewise exhibits similarities across the countries in its natural logarithm. While South 
Africa can be seen to have the highest level of economic growth, Gambia has the lowest level of 
economic growth. On the average, Egypt has the strongest currency among the countries 
employed in the study, with an average exchange rate of 1.78 in its natural logarithm to the US$ 
while Sierra Leone has the weakest currency of 8.13 in natural logarithm to the US$. The real 
interest rate signifying the real borrowing cost is highest in Gambia and lowest in Algeria. 










CC GE PS RL RQ VA 
Algeria 24.64 25.76 4.33 2.02 -0.55 -0.55 -1.27 -0.69 -0.90 -0.96 
Egypt 24.25 25.99 1.78 2.11 -0.57 -0.50 -0.99 -0.22 -0.42 -1.07 
Gambia 19.21 20.57 3.37 21.43 -0.62 -0.64 0.12 -0.39 -0.40 -0.99 
Kenya 22.58 24.34 4.38 6.36 -0.99 -0.53 -1.25 -0.86 -0.22 -0.27 
Lesotho 20.11 21.53 2.11 5.79 0.01 -0.35 0.07 -0.20 -0.55 -0.21 
Liberia 19.18 20.92 4.21 7.43 -0.78 -1.36 -1.10 -1.18 -1.29 -0.53 
Malawi 20.41 22.53 5.13 13.71 -0.61 -0.60 0.001 -0.22 -0.58 -0.28 
Mauritius 21.46 22.95 3.41 9.68 0.49 0.79 0.87 0.95 0.76 0.85 
Mozambique 21.28 22.93 3.31 12.25 -0.56 -0.56 0.14 -0.66 -0.46 -0.14 
Nigeria 24.39 26.48 4.96 4.19 -1.13 -1.02 -1.93 -1.22 -0.87 -0.72 
Rwanda 20.74 22.36 6.39 8.65 0.11 -0.28 -0.56 -0.47 -0.36 -1.25 
Sierra Leone 19.69 21.63 8.13 10.42 -0.90 -1.23 -0.34 -1.01 -0.92 -0.34 
South Africa 24.93 26.60 2.11 4.14 0.17 0.49 -0.08 0.10 0.50 0.61 
Swaziland 20.29 22.17 2.11 4.58 -0.33 -0.71 -0.21 -0.58 -0.52 -1.28 
Tanzania 22.76 24.08 7.19 4.63 -0.62 -0.52 -0.32 -0.42 -0.42 -0.24 
Uganda 22.18 23.60 7.66 12.39 -0.90 -0.50 -1.09 -0.43 -0.16 -0.56 
Source: Author’s computation from WDI and WGI data. 
Note: CC is the control of corruption, GE is government effectiveness, PS is political stability, RL is rule of law, RQ is 
regulatory quality, VA is voice/accountability. 
In terms of governance indicators, of the 16 African countries employed in the model, only 
Lesotho, Mauritius, Rwanda and South Africa have a positive value for the control of corruption 
which denotes healthier control of corruption in these countries. Among these four countries, 
Mauritius controls corruption better as indicated by its higher value with respect to the other 
countries. Also, Nigeria can be seen to have the lowest level of corruption control amongst the 




countries in our model with a value of -1.13. Of course, this means that corruption is prevalent in 
the country. Furthermore, the Table reveals that South Africa has a more effective government 
compared to other countries in our model while Liberia has the lowest government 
effectiveness. Also, Table 3.1 shows that Mauritius is more politically stable than the other 
countries in our model. Gambia, Lesotho, Malawi and Mozambique are the other countries that 
enjoy a relatively stable political environment as indicated by their positive values. Mauritius and 
South Africa have a strong rule of law while Nigeria has the weakest rule of law as indicated by 
their values. In terms of regulatory quality and voice/accountability, Mauritius also has the best 
of both while Liberia has the lowest, in terms of regulatory quality as an indicator of quality 
governance, Swaziland has the lowest level of voice/accountability. The quality of governance 
in Mauritius might as well be a good reason why the country has a very low rate of poverty with 
less than 1 per cent of its population living on $1 a day or less (see, borgenproject.org). 
 
Table 3.2. Correlation Matrix 
 DI GDP EXC RI CC GE PS RQ RL VA 
DI 1.0000          
GDP 0.9804 1.0000         
EXC -0.1120 -0.1201 1.0000        
RI -0.3368 -0.3489 0.1281 1.0000       
CC -0.0073 -0.0608 -0.3887 -0.0427 1.0000      
GE 0.3368 0.2715 -0.3290 -0.0384 0.7790 1.0000     
PS -0.3827 -0.4279 -0.2285 0.2201 0.6503 0.5355 1.0000    
RQ 0.2689 0.2330 -0.2203 0.0142 0.6351 0.8803 0.5100 1.0000   
RL 0.1046 0.0537 -0.3098 0.0652 0.7635 0.8785 0.6971 0.8117 1.0000  
VA 0.1107 0.0977 -0.0877 -0.0105 0.4102 0.5775 0.4942 0.5659 0.5547 1.0000 
Source: Author’s computation. 
Note: DI is domestic investment, GDP is economic growth, EXC is exchange rate, RI is real interest rate, CC is the 
control of corruption, GE is government effectiveness, PS is political stability, RQ is regulatory quality, RL is rule of law, 
VA is voice/accountability. 
Table 3.2 is the correlation analysis, which shows the correlation between the variables in 
our model. The table reveals that domestic investment and economic growth have a strong 
positive correlation to the value of 0.98. The table also shows that exchange rate, real interest 
rate, the control of corruption and political stability all have negative correlations with domestic 
investment. Furthermore, our explanatory variables do not have a strong correlation with each 
other, which then solves the issue of multicollinearity apart from the governance indicators 
which we would include in separate regressions. 
The result from the principal component analysis in Table 3.3 reveals that the study retains 
the first PC for the three constructed governance indices since their eigenvalues are greater 
than one and represent 75 per cent of the information in political governance, 94 per cent of the 




information in economic governance and 88 per cent of the information in institutional 
governance. 
 
Table 3.3. Principal Component Analysis of Governance Indicators 
Principal 
Component 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative Eigenvalue 
 PS VA GE RQ CC RL    
Political Gov          
First PC 0.7071 0.7071     0.7471 0.7471 1.4942 
Second PC 0.7071 -0.7071     0.2529 1.0000 0.5057 
Economic Gov          
First PC   0.7071 0.7071   0.9401 0.9401 1.8803 
Second PC   0.7071 -0.7071   0.0599 1.0000 0.1197 
Institutional Gov          
First PC     0.7071 0.7071 0.8818 0.8818 1.7635 
Second PC     -0.7071 0.7071 0.1182 1.0000 0.2364 
Source: Author’s computation. 
Note: PC denotes principal component. Gov denotes governance. CC is the control of corruption, GE is government 
effectiveness, PS is political stability, RQ is regulatory quality, RL is rule of law, VA is voice/accountability. 
 
Tables 3.4 to 3.6 show the empirical results on the nexus between governance and domestic 
investment in Africa. Though the results across the various econometric techniques show that 
governance generally has a positive influence on domestic investment, for policy inference, the 
study needs to decide on the appropriate baseline model. The study estimated the F-test to 
choose between the pooled OLS and FE model. A significant F-test probability value indicates 
that the FE model is more suitable than the pooled OLS. The choice between the RE model and 
the pooled OLS employing the BP LM test also suggests that the RE model is more suitable 
while the Hausman test suggests that the FE model is more suitable in comparison to the RE 
model. 
Our baseline model then becomes the FE model. The study then proceeds to test for 
heteroskedasticity with results suggesting that our models (Tables 3.4 to 3.6) all suffer from 
non-constant variance in the error term. Results from the serial correlation test of Wooldridge 
also show that all our models suffer from serial correlation while the Pesaran CD and Pesaran 
Scaled LM tests for cross-sectional dependence show contrary results at 5 per cent level of 
statistical significance. While the Pesaran CD test indicates the absence of cross-sectional 
dependence, the Pesaran Scaled LM test indicates its presence. However, the study account 
for these biases in the FE model employing the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors which 
correct for heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and cross-sectional dependence using a non-
parametric covariance matrix estimator (see Hoechle, 2007). 
 





Table 3.4. Political Governance and Domestic Investment in Africa 








































































































































        








    








R2 Overall 0.9632 0.9614 0.9553  0.9614 0.9610 0.9519  0.9614 0.9610 0.9519  
R2 Between  0.9784 0.9706   0.9789 0.9682   0.9789 0.9682  
R2 Within  0.7626 0.7508 0.7626  0.7603 0.7561 0.7603  0.7603 0.7561 0.7603 
F-Stat 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
F-Test  0.0000    0.0000    0.0000   
Wald   0.0000    0.0000    0.0000  
Hausman   0.0350    0.0000    0.0000  
B-P LM   0.0000    0.0000    0.0000  
M.Wald  0.0000    0.0000    0.0000   
Wooldridge  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Pesaran CD  0.2969 0.0000   0.2969 0.0000   0.1216 0.0000  
Pesaran 
Scaled LM 
 0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Observations 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 
Source: Author’s computation. 
Note: Dependent Variable: Domestic Investment. GDP is economic growth, RI is the real interest rate, CC is the control 
of corruption, RL is rule of law, Polgov is political governance, B-P LM is Breusch Pagan Langragian Multiplier test, 
M.Wald is the Modified Wald test for heteroskedasticity. Probability values of coefficients are in parenthesis. Diagnosis 
and post-estimation test results presented are probability values. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 
10%, respectively. 
Results in Table 3.4 on the relationship between political governance and domestic 
investment along with its elements reveals that an improvement in political stability increases 
domestic investment in Africa by 0.125 percentage point and this relationship is significant at 5 
per cent statistical level. Similarly, voice/accountability increases domestic investment by 0.177 
percentage point while an improvement in political governance increases domestic investment 
by 0.109 percentage point significantly. 




The F-statistics probability values which are less than 5 per cent indicates that all the 
variables in the model together have a significant influence on domestic investment in Africa. 
Further results revealed that economic growth significantly spurs domestic investment while the 
exchange rate and the real interest rate are insignificant to domestic investment in Africa. 
 
Table 3.5. Economic Governance and Domestic Investment in Africa 







































































































































        








    








R2 Overall 0.9639 0.9607 0.9556  0.9624 0.9612 0.9549  0.9632 0.9612 0.9549  
R2 Between  0.9788 0.9727   0.9787 0.9708   0.9787 0.9708  
R2 Within  0.7561 0.7520 0.7561  0.7586 0.7488 0.7586  0.7586 0.7488 0.7586 
F-Stat 0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
F-Test  0.0000    0.0000    0.0000   
Wald   0.0000    0.0000    0.0000  
Hausman   0.0000    0.0000    0.0000  
B-P LM   0.0000    0.0000    0.0000  
M.Wald  0.0000    0.0000    0.0000   
Wooldridge  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Pesaran CD  0.1675 0.0000   0.1675 0.0000   0.2106 0.0000  
Pesaran 
Scaled LM 
 0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Observations 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 
Source: Author’s computation. 
Note: Dependent Variable: Domestic Investment. GDP is economic growth, RI is the real interest rate, CC is the control 
of corruption, RL is rule of law, Ecogov is economic governance, B-P LM is Breusch Pagan Langragian Multiplier test, 
M.Wald is the Modified Wald test for heteroskedasticity. Probability values of coefficients are in parenthesis. Diagnosis 
and post-estimation test results presented are probability values. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 
10%, respectively. 
On the relationship between economic governance (and its components) and domestic 
investment, empirical results, as indicated in Table 3.5 reveal that government effectiveness 




has a positive but insignificant relationship with domestic investment in Africa. Regulatory 
quality has a positive and significant relationship with domestic investment in Africa at 10 per 
cent statistical level of significance and economic governance also has a positive and significant 
influence on domestic investment. While regulatory quality spurs domestic investment by 0.124 
percentage point, economic governance enhances domestic investment by 0.066 percentage 
point. The result also discloses similar findings from Table 3.4 that economic growth significantly 
spurs domestic investment in Africa while the exchange rate and the real interest rate are 
insignificant in driving domestic investment. 
 
Table 3.6. Institutional Governance and Domestic Investment in Africa 

































































































































        








    








R2 Overall 0.9648 0.9616 0.9574  0.9644 0.9626 0.9576  0.9644 0.9626 0.9576  
R2 Between  0.9789 0.9731   0.9802 0.9735   0.9802 0.9735  
R2 Within  0.7604 0.7476 0.7604  0.7591 0.7475 0.7591  0.7591 0.7475 0.7591 
F-Stat 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
F-Test  0.0000    0.0000    0.0000   
Wald   0.0000    0.0000    0.0000  
Hausman   0.0000    0.0000    0.0000  
B-P LM   0.0000    0.0000    0.0000  
M.Wald  0.0000    0.0000    0.0000   
Wooldridge  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Pesaran CD  0.3692 0.0000   0.0590 0.0000   0.0590 0.0000  
Pesaran 
Scaled LM 
 0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Observations 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 
Source: Author’s computation. 
Note: Dependent Variable: Domestic Investment. GDP is economic growth, RI is the real interest rate, CC is the control 
of corruption, RL is rule of law, Instgov is institutional governance, B-P LM is Breusch Pagan Langragian Multiplier test, 
M.Wald is the Modified Wald test for heteroskedasticity. Probability values of coefficients are in parenthesis. Diagnosis 




and post-estimation test results presented, are probability values. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 
10%, respectively. 
Finally, from Table 3.6 on the relationship between institutional governance and its 
constituents on domestic investment, empirical outcomes reveal that the control of corruption 
positively and significantly drives domestic investment in Africa, Improvements in controlling 
corruption in Africa increases domestic investment by 0.155 percentage point and this 
relationship is statistically significant at 5 per cent level. Rule of law also positively and 
significantly drive domestic investment by 0.145 percentage point while institutional governance 
positively and significantly increases domestic by 0.078 percentage point. Economic growth 
from Table 3.6 remains a driving factor for domestic investment in Africa, while the exchange 
rate and real interest rate remain insignificant. 
 
 
4. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
The quality of governance in Africa has been generally understood to be poor as political crises, 
corruption, absence of the rule of law abound in most countries in the region. It has also been 
argued that governance performs a central role in explaining the dynamics of macroeconomic 
aggregates both in developed and developing economies. This study thereby accessed the 
impact of governance on domestic investment in Africa employing unbundled and bundled 
governance indicators for 16 African countries between 2002 and 2015 and adopting the 
Driscoll and Kraay FE model which accounts for most biases in panel econometric modelling. 
The results revealed that all the indicators of governance employed in this study have positive 
and statistically significant influences on domestic investment in Africa except for government 
effectiveness which has a positive but insignificant influence on the outcome variable. The 
results further revealed that voice/accountability and the control of corruption have the most 
significant impact on domestic investment in Africa, as indicated by their coefficient values. It 
can thus be said that the quality of governance is a significant factor in explaining the level of 
domestic investment in Africa. Also, economic growth has a strongly positive and significant 
impact on domestic investment in the continent. 
The recommendations of this study are straightforward: African leaders should as a matter of 
urgency endeavour to improve the quality of governance by ensuring political stability. Political 
stability can be achieved through engagement, empowerment and education of the youths in 
order to curb any potential civil unrest. Youths are specifically mentioned here due to the ‘youth 
bulge’ existing on the African continent. Poverty also has a strong potential for generating 
political instability. A reduction in povertyis necessary to ensure a more stable political 
environment in Africa. Inclusive growth policies must be adopted in order for the poor to 
participate in the growth process. There also have to be development and implementation of 
economic development policies in the areas of health, education, nutrition and sanitation, which 
ultimately leads to the reduction in poverty. Moreover, for there to be an increase in domestic 




investment in Africa, citizens should be able to partake in choosing their governments as well as 
enjoy the liberty to express themselves. If citizens can choose the leaders they want, devoid of 
electoral malpractices, this does not only lead to a more stable political environment but also a 
more stable economic environment which ensures domestic investment activities. 
Furthermore, African governments should implement sound monetary and fiscal policies that 
are in line with current economic realities to promote the private sector and increase domestic 
investment. Again, there is a need to curb corruption in Africa. This can be achieved through 
sanctions, i.e. the punishment of corrupt political office holders. Public sector reforms are also 
necessary to improve financial management in the public sector. Citizens as well have a role to 
play by holding their governments accountable. There has to be an improvement in the quality 
of contract enforcement, property rights and a reduction in crime and violence for domestic 
investment to increase in Africa. Economic policies should also be targeted towards improving 
economic growth in Africa, which will precipitate an increase in domestic investment. 
In conclusion, future studies can assess how the established findings withstand scrutiny 
within the comparative framework of the Washington Consensus versus the Beijing Model. It is 
important to note that governance indicators employed are prioritised differently by the two 
contemporary paradigms of development. While the Washington Consensus prioritises political 
governance, the Beijing Model emphasizes economic governance. More insights into the 
dynamics of the paradigms are apparent in recent literature on the subject (Asongu and Ssozi, 





Ajide, K. (2013). The role of Governance on Private Investment in Nigeria: A Preliminary 
Analysis. Central Bank of Nigeria Economic and Financial Review, 51(1), 93-119. 
Akanbi, O. (2010). Role of Governance in explaining Domestic Investment in Nigeria. University 
of Pretoria, Working Paper 168. 
Algieri, B., & Mannarino, L. (2013). The Role of Credit Conditions and Local Financial 
Development on Export Performances: A focus on the Italian Regions, Universita della 
Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia e Statistica. Retrieved from 
http://www.ecostat.unical.it/WP2/WP/10_A%20panel%20analysis%20for%20the%20sectoral
%20manufacturing%20exports.pdf 
Amaz, C., Gaume, V., & Lefevre, M. (2012). The impact of Training on Firm Scrap Rate: A study 
of Panel Data. Retrieved from http://www-
perso.gate.cnrs.fr/polome/Pages2012_13/Panel/LEFEVRE_GAUME_AMAZ_rapport.pdf 
Asiedu, E. (2003). Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: The role of Government Policy, 
Governance and Political Instability. University of Kansas Working Paper. 
Asongu, S. (2012). On the effect of Foreign Aid on Corruption. Economics Bulletin, 32(3), 2174-
2180. doi:  https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2493289 




Asongu, S. (2016). Determinants of Growth in Fast-Developing Countries: Evidence from 
Bundling and Unbundling Institutions. Politics & Policy, 44(1), 97-134. doi:  
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2493289 
Asongu, S. (2016). Sino-African Relations: A Review and Reconciliation of Dominant Schools of 
Thought. Politics and Policy, 44(2). doi:  https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12152 
Asongu, S., & Nwachukwu, J. (2016). The role of Governance in mobile phones for Inclusive 
Human Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Technovation, 1-13. doi:  
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.technovation.2016.04.002 
Asongu, S., & Nwanchukwu, J. (2017). Fighting Capital Flight in Africa: Evidence from Bundling 
and Unbundling Governance. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 17(3), 305-323. 
doi:  https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-016-0240-1 
Asongu, S., & Ssozi, J. (2016). Sino-African Relations: Some Solutions and Strategies to the 
Policy Syndromes. Journal of African Business, 17(1), 33-51. doi:  
https://doi.org/10.1080/15228916.2015.1089614 
Asongu, S., Batuo, E., & Tchamyou, V. (2015). Bundling Governance: Finance versus 
Institutions in Private Investment Promotion. African Development Institute Working Paper 
15/051. doi:  https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2713087 
Asongu, S., Tchamyou, V., Asongu, N., & Tchamyou, N. (2017). Fighting Terrorism in Africa: 
Evidence from Bundling and Unbundling Institutions. Empirical Economics, 1-51. doi:  
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2885742 
Aysan, A., Gaobo, P., & Marie-Ange, V. (2005). How to boost Private Investment in the MENA 
Countries: The role of Economic Reforms. Topics in Middle Eastern and North African 
Economics, MEEA, Online Journal, 7, 1-15. 
Aysan, A., Nabli, M., & Veganzones, M. (2011). Governance and Private Investment in the 
Middle East and North Africa. HAL archives. Retrieved from https://halshs.archives-
ouvertes.fr/halschs-00557250 
Bader, M., & Malawi, A. (2010). The impact of Interest Rate on Investment in Jordan: A 
Cointegration Analysis. Journal of King Abdul Aziz University: Economics and 
Administration, 24(1), 199-209. doi:  https://doi.org/10.4197/Eco.24-1.6 
Baek, S., & Yang, D. (2010). Institutional Quality, Capital Flight and Capital Flows. Korean 
Economic Review, 26(1), 121-155. 
Baltagi, B., Kao, C., & Peng, B. (2016). Testing Cross-Sectional Correlation in Large Panel Data 
Models with Serial Correlation. Econometrics, 1-24. doi:  
https://doi.org/10.3390/econometrics4040044 
Batina, R. (1998). On the long run effect of Public Capital and Disaggregated Public Capital on 
Aggregate Output. International Tax and Public Finance, 5, 263-281. doi:  
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008626025932 
Bjuggren, P., Dzansi, J., & Shukur, G. (2010). Remittances and Investment. Centre for 
Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies Working Paper 216. 
Caporale, M., Raul, C., Sova, R., & Sova, A. (2009). Financial Development and Economic 




Growth: Evidence from Ten EU Members. DIW Berlin Discussion Paper 940. doi:  
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1499786 
Chauvet, L., & Collier, P. (2004). Development Effectiveness in Fragile States: Spillovers and 
Turnarounds. Centre for the Study of African Economies. Department of Economics, Oxford 
University (Mimeo). 
Chuku, C., Onye, K., & Ajah, H. (2015). Structural and Institutional Determinants of Investment 
activity in Africa. MPRA Paper 68163. doi:  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44787-2_2 
De Hoyos, R., & Sarafidis, V. (2006). Testing for Cross-Sectional Dependence in Panel Data 
Models . The Stata Journal, 6(4), 482-496. doi:  
https://doi.org/10.1177/1536867X0600600403 
Driscoll, J., & Kraay, A. (1998). Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation with Spatial Dependent 
Data. Review of Economic and Statistics, 80, 549-560. doi:  
https://doi.org/10.1162/003465398557825 
Drukker, D. (2003). Testing for Serial Correlation in Linear Panel Data Models. The Stata 
Journal, 3(2), 168-177. doi:  https://doi.org/10.1177/1536867X0300300206 
Eregha, P. (2010). Interest Rate Variation and Investment Determination in Nigeria. 
International Business Management, 4(2), 41-46. doi:  
https://doi.org/10.3923/ibm.2010.41.46 
Fayissa, B., & Nsiah, C. (2010). The impact of Governance on Economic Growth: Further 
Evidence from Africa. Journal of Developing Areas, 47(1), 91-108. doi:  
https://doi.org/10.1353/jda.2013.0009 
Globerman, S., & Shapiro, D. (2002). Global Foreign Direct Investment Flows: The Role of 
Governance Infrastructure. World Development, 30(11), 1899-1919. doi:  
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(02)00110-9 
Hamuda, A., Sulikova, V., Gazda, V., & Horvath, D. (2013). ARDL Investment model in Tunisia. 
Theoretical and Applied Economics, 20(2), 57-68. 
Hoechle, D. (2007). Robust Standard Errors for Panel Regressions with Cross-Sectional 
Dependence. The Stata Journal, 7(3), 281-312. doi:  
https://doi.org/10.1177/1536867X0700700301 
Iheonu, C., & Nwakeze, N. (2016). Investment, Output and Real Interest Rate in Nigeria: An 
ARDL Analysis. Journal of Economics and Allied Research, 1(1), 72-86. 
Jolliffe, I. (2002). Principal Component Analysis (2nd ed.). New York: Springer. 
Kaiser, P. (1974). An Index of Factorial Simplicity. Psychometrika, 51(4), 804-821. doi:  
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02291575 
Khan, M. (2007). Governance, Economic Growth and Development since the 1960s. DESA 
Working Paper 54. 
Lasker, M., & King, M. (1997). Modified Wald Test for Regression Disturbances. Economic 
Letters, 56(1), 5-11. doi:  https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00128-6 
Lim, J. (2014). Institutional and Structural Determinants of Investment Worldwide. Journal of 
Macroeconomics, 41, 160-177. doi:  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2014.05.007 




Mengistu, A., & Adhikary, B. (2011). Does good Governance matter for FDI inflows? Evidence 
from Asian Economies. Asia Pacific Business Review, 17, 281-299. doi:  
https://doi.org/10.1080/13602381003755765 
Morisset, J. (2000). Foreign Direct Investment in Africa-Policies also matter. Transnational 
Corporation, 9(2), 107-125. 
Ngov, P. (2008). Governance, Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth. Forum of 
International Development Studies, 36, 255-278. 
Ouedrago, I., & Kouaman, P. (2014). Governance and Private Investment in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. International Journal of African Development, 2(1), 5-25. 
Pereira, A. (2000). Is all Public Capital Created Equal? The Review of Economic and Statistics, 
82(3), 513-518. doi:  https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.2000.82.3.513 
Pereira, A. (2001). Public Capital Formation and Private Investment: What Crowds in what? 
Public Finance Review, 29(1), 3-25. doi:  https://doi.org/10.1177/109114210102900101 
Pesaran, M. (2004). General Diagnostic Test for Cross Section Dependence in Panels. 
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics Working Papers 0435. 
Romer, D. (2012). Advanced Macroeconomics (Fourth ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Samani, A., & Ariani, F. (2010). Governance and FDI in MENA region. Australian Journal of 
Basic and Applied Sciences, 4, 4880-4882. 
Stock, J., & Watson, M. (2008). Heteroskedasticity-Robust Standard Errors for Fixed Effects 
Regression. Econometrica, 76, 155-174. doi:  https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0012-
9682.2008.00821.x 
Tchamyou, S. (2017). The role of Knowledge Economy in African Business. Journal of the 
Knowledge Economy, 8(4), 1189-1228. doi:  https://doi.org/10.1007/s13132-016-0417-1 
The Borgen Project. (2017). Addressing Five Causes of Poverty in Mauritius. Retrieved from 
http://borgenproject.org/causes-of-poverty-in-mauritius/ 
Tobin, J. (1969). A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory. Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking, 1(1), 15-29. doi:  https://doi.org/10.2307/1991374 



















Table A1: Definition of Governance Variables 
Variable Functional Definition 
Control of corruption According to the World Governance Indicator (2017), the control of corruption is the 
viewpoint of the degree to which public power is used for private gain, comprising both 
minor and grand forms of corruption, as well as the capture of the state by elites and 
private interests.  
 
Government effectiveness According to the World Governance Indicator (2017), government effectiveness 
captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service 
and the extent of its independence from political forces, the quality of policy design 
and execution, and the reliability of the government's commitment to such policies.  
 
Political stability/absence of violence 
and terrorism 
According to the World Governance Indicator (2017), this captures perceptions of the 
chances of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. 
 
Rule of Law According to the World Governance Indicator (2017), the rule of law reveals 
perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
guidelines of society, and specifically, the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, courts and the police, as well as the chances of crime and violence.  
Regulatory Quality Regulatory Quality captures perceptions of the capability of the government to design 
and execute sound policies and rules that allow and promote private sector 
development (World Governance Indicator, 2017). 
Voice/Accountability According to the World Governance Indicator (2017), voice and accountability capture 
insights to the extent to which a country's citizens are able to partake in choosing their 
government, as well as liberty to express, freedom of association, and a free media.  
Political Governance According to Asongu et al (2017), this is defined as the election and replacement of 
political leaders. This index is measured with two indicators, which are political 
stability/no violence and voice/accountability.  
Economic Governance According to Asongu et al (2017), economic governance is defined as the formulation 
and implementation of policies that deliver public commodities. This index is measured 
with two indicators which are regulatory quality and government effectiveness. 
Institutional Governance According to Asongu et al (2017), institution governance is defined as the respect by 
the State and citizens of institutions that govern interactions between them. This index 
is measured with two variables: corruption-control and the rule of law 
 
